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Abstract
Evidence on international capital ‡ows suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) is
less volatile than other …nancial ‡ows. To explain this …nding, I model international capital
‡ows under the assumptions of imperfect enforcement of …nancial contracts and inalienabil-
ity of FDI. Imperfect enforcement of contracts leads to endogenous …nancing constraints and
the pricing of default risk. Inalienability implies that it is not as advantageous to expro-
priate FDI relative to other ‡ows. These features combine to give a risk sharing advantage
to FDI over other capital ‡ows. This risk sharing advantage of FDI translates into a lower
default premium and lower sensitivity to changes in a country’s …nancing constraint.
The model o¤ers the new implication that …nancially constrained countries should bor-
row relatively more through FDI. This is because FDI is harder to expropriate and not
because FDI is more productive or less volatile. Using several creditworthiness and country
risk ratings to measure …nancing constraints, I present new evidence linking FDI and …-
nancing constraints. Moreover, numerical simulations of the model generate stronger serial
correlation for FDI than for other ‡ows into developing countries. This corroborates the
view that non-FDI ‡ows are more short-term and more likely to change direction.
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enforcement, …nancing constraints, default risk, country risk.
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International private capital ‡ows represent a major source of …nancing of economic activity
in developing countries. For these countries, it is often argued that a critical component of
international …nancing is foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI).1 The argument is based
on two observations. First, foreign direct investment is less volatile than other forms of in-
ternational capital ‡ows. Second, the share of FDI is higher for developing versus developed
countries.2 As discussed below, existing theories of FDI have di¢culty in accounting for these
facts. This paper attempts to …ll in this vacuum by arguing that FDI is a form of investment
that is best suited to provide risk sharing in a world economy where …nancial contracts are
plagued by imperfect enforcement mechanisms.
There is substantial evidence that FDI ‡ows are less volatile than other forms of …nancial
‡ows to developing countries. Some of this evidence comes from crisis episodes. The World
Bank’s (1999a) “Global Financial Development” reports that during the Latin America debt
crisis of the 1980’s FDI ‡ows to these countries collapsed, but the fall in other long-term (and
short-term) ‡owsfrombanksandthebondmarket was7 timesgreater. A parallel story occurred
during the Mexican debt crisis in 1994. FDI in‡ows fell from US $11 billion in 1994 to US $8
billion in 1996, a drop of27 percent, and recovered fully by 1997. However, portfolio equity and
debt ‡ows fell by 89 percent and 45 percent respectively in just one year, from 1994 to 1995.
The 1997 currency and banking crisis in East Asia saw a drop of 22 percent in net-long term
in‡ows to these countries, while FDI was extremely resilient falling by less than 5 percent from
1997 to 1998.3
Evidence of di¤erential volatility is also abundant outside crisis periods. Figure 1 plots
the histogram of the (absolute value of the) ratio of the coe¢cient of variation of net private
FDI in‡ows versus that of net private non-FDI in‡ows.4 The data is from the World Bank
1Investment through FDI alone represents a large portion of overall domestic investment. For example, in
the 10 major recipient countries of FDI during the 1990-97 period–all developing countries–FDI accounted for
an average of roughly 20 percent of total private investment. For the overall sample of developing countries it
accounted for 8.7 percent of gross …xed capital formation in 1996 (see World Bank 1999a). Furthermore, FDI
out‡ows from developing countries were roughly non-existent over the 1990-97 period. The evidence is quite
di¤erent for developed countries. While these countries have the largest in‡ows and out‡ows of FDI, the net
‡ow is typically small.
2Evidence on the relative size of FDI into developing countries is brie‡y discussed in section 5.1.
3The countries considered are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The data on net
in‡ows to these countries includes FDI and o¢cial ‡ows, so 22 percent is presumably a lower bound on the
reduction of private capital in‡ows.
4Both ‡ows are normalized by gross private capital ‡ows. Normalizing by GDP adjusted for purchasing power
parity or using HP-…ltered ‡ows in constant dollar terms gives similar results.
1(1999b) “World Development Indicators” (WDI) and covers 111 countries from 1975 to 1997,
with varying time spans. According to Figure 1, 89 percent of thecountries in the sample have
lower coe¢cient of variation of FDI than that of other in‡ows. Themedian (average) coe¢cient
of variation is 0.77 (1.11) for FDI and 1.88 (8.81) for non-FDI ‡ows.
This di¤erence in volatilities is also present when restricting attention to long term ‡ows.
Lipsey (1999) computes the coe¢cient of variation of several capital ‡ows from 1969-1993.
He reports signi…cant di¤erences in volatility between FDI and other net long term ‡ows for
developing countries and to a lesser extent to developed countries: the ratio of FDI’s volatility
to that of long term non-FDI ‡ows is about 0.59 for Latin America, 0.74 for South East Asia,
0.86 for Europe, and 0.88 for the US.5
[Figure 1 here.]
My point of departure is this: a typical characteristic of FDI into developing countries is
that recipient countries are generally unable to operate (at least as e¢ciently, if at all) these
investments without the intangible assets of the multinational company. Examples of these
intangible assets include human and organization capital, and technological advances. Because
these assets are inalienable to a large extent, their residual value to the recipient country
is relatively small. For example, multinationals typically rely on blueprints to secure their
investments. This is truein high technology industries such as pharmaceuticals, but also in low
technology ones such as the soft drink industry.6 However, most other investments including
5UNCTAD (1998), World Bank (1999a), and Lipsey (1999, 2001) also report that FDI is unconditionally less
volatile than other ‡ows. Also related are the studies by Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and Popper (1996) who observe
that FDI responds less to shocks, and Sarno and Taylor (1999) that show that FDI is mostly composed of a
permanent component. Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) is the only study I know of that fails to con…rm
this …nding. However, they use a much smaller sample of 5 developed and 5 developing countries.
6Clearly, though, by investing abroad multinationals increase the likelihood of dissipating the value of their
intangible assets. This occurs because host countries of FDI can hire a specialized workforce from abroad, or
train their own work force. However, these possibilities are …nancially costly and typically involve a large time
lag from expropriation to using the capital in place. Reverse engineering is one of the most popular ways to
imitate a technology. Mans…eld et al. (1981) report the estimated imitation cost and time for 48 new products
in the Chemicals, Drugs, Electronics, and machinery industries. These estimates are based on surveys to some
of the largest US …rms in these 4 industries. For innovations costing over $1 million, an average of 23 percent of
the products cost more to imitate than they did to innovate and an average of 17 percent of the products took
more time to imitate than they did to innovate. These authors also report that most products cost at least 50
percent in time and dollars to replicate. It is our belief that these imitation costs are likely to be much higher
for …rms in developing and low income countries. In a di¤erent survey, Mans…eld and Romeo (1980) report that
10 out of 26 technologies became known to some non-US competitor after at least 4.5 years.
2bank loans and bond …nancing are fully appropriable. For my analysis, partial inalienability is
the main di¤erence between direct investment and other international in‡ows of capital.
The existence of intangible assets in many production/managerial activities together with
market imperfections that prevent the correct pricing of these assets has been used to justify
transnational corporations, i.e., intra-…rm as opposed to arm’s length relationships (e.g. Caves
(1982, 1996)). The empirical evidence recently surveyed by Caves (1996) broadly suggests that
this is an important force driving FDI. For example, research and development and advertising
expenditures–typically associated with the presence of intangible assets–are larger in industries
in which there is a stronger presence of transnational corporations.
The second main assumption of the paper is that international …nancing contracts lack the
proper mechanisms to enforce repayment. In Section 2, I build a model of the composition
of international capital ‡ows to developing countries based on these two main premises: (i)
that FDI is partly inalienable to the extent that it comprises intangible assets, and (ii) that
sovereign capital ‡ows are subject to expropriation due to the lack international enforcement
mechanisms.
Section 3 analyses the predictions of the model for the optimal composition of international
capital ‡ows. First, because of expropriation risk, capital ‡ows into …nancially constrained
countries command a default premium. Second, because FDI is partly inalienable, the default
premium associated with FDI in‡ows is lower than that of non-FDI in‡ows giving it a risk
sharing advantage. This implies that …nancially constrained countries get a larger share of
FDI. Moreover, a higher default premium to non-FDI ‡ows means that changes in a country’s
borrowing constraint a¤ect non-FDI ‡ows to a greater extent.
In section 4, I use numerical simulations methods to investigate the ability of the model
to quantitatively match the empirical volatility of FDI versus other capital ‡ows. I start by
illustrating the dynamicsofinternational capital ‡owsimplied by the …nancing contract. I then
extend the model to allow for the possibility of exogenous contract terminations. This permits
the computation of the stationary distribution of countries implied by the model. Using the
stationary distribution I …nd that the model is able to capturethe relative volatility di¤erences
in capital ‡ows observed in thedata. Themodel also generates considerable persistence in ‡ows
partly becauseit contains anendogenouspropagation mechanism. Thedynamicsofcapital ‡ows
into developed and developing countries are also analyzed.
InSection 5, I investigateempirically themodel’s new predictionthat …nancially constrained
3countries have relatively larger in‡ows of FDI capital. I identify …nancing constraints with low
sovereign credit ratings, but also, more broadly, with low overall country risk ratings. I …nd a
negative association between the FDI share of gross private‡ows and a country’s credit rating.
Moreover, the association between FDI share and credit rating is robust to conditioning on
other variables, including GDP. The variation in credit rating accounts for a signi…cant portion
of the total variation in FDI in‡ows. This represents new evidence on the dynamics of FDI
and is broadly supportive of the model. Also supportive of the model is the evidence presented
in subsection 5.2 that FDI and non-FDI private capital ‡ows (as percentages of gross ‡ows)
display considerable persistence.
The combined empirical …ndings I discuss are hard to understand with other explanations
for FDI. First, theories based on competitive advantages (e.g. lower input costs, supply of
skilled/unskilled workers, market proximity) or taxation do not seem able to explain the sys-
tematic cross sectional evidence that FDI ‡ows are less volatile than other investment ‡ows,
though they are certainly useful in accounting for the level of FDI (see Razin, Sadka, and Yuen
(1998) fora discussion of taxesand capital ‡ows). Second, FDI ‡owsto developing countries are
mostly in the form of Green…eld investments as opposed to mergers and acquisitions.7 Hence, it
does not seem a good starting point to explain FDI ‡ows to developing countries by appealing
to high domestic corporate costs of external …nancing (see Froot and Stein 1991).8
Finally, my theory does not make use ofinvestment irreversibilities (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck
1994) or inertia type arguments as in Albuquerque and Rebelo (2000). Though these arelikely
candidates to explain the lower volatility of FDI, they would have a hard time in explaining
the connection between a country’s credit worthiness and FDI ‡ows. Two important remarks
about FDI being irreversible are in order. In practice, FDI can be easily reversed. For example,
the subsidiary can borrow against its collateral domestically, and lend the money back to the
parent company. As another example, note that a considerableportion ofFDI is intercompany
debt, which the parent company may recall at short notice. (Both strategies would result in
a drop in measured FDI.9) The second remark is that in bad times all …nancial products are
7Green…eld investments (e.g. setting up a subsidiary from scratch) accounted for roughly 87 percent of the
FDI into developing countries in 1997, and 94 percent in 1991 (see UNCTAD (1998)).
8It could be argued that more favorable asset prices resulting from large exchange rate depreciations, like
those in East Asia in 1997, would favor FDI. But, then, how do we rationalize the large decrease in portfolio
equity ‡ows in East Asian countries?
9Measures of FDI usually report all …nancial transactions between a foreign multinational and a subsidiary
that is at least 10 percent owned by the former (e.g. retained earnings, equity capital, and intercompany debt
transactions). An investmentwith an equity share of less than 10 percent may be counted as FDI if a management
4illiquid and thus costlier to move around. Thus, the role of irreversibility becomes an empirical
question.
The model is closely related to that of Thomas and Worral (1994). They analyzetheinvest-
ment dynamics of multinational companies. I extend their framework to accommodate hetero-
geneous capital ‡ows, the possibility of exogenous contract terminations and the simulation of
a worldwide distribution of countries. I also explicitly model the lifetime utility maximization
problem of the domestic consumer in autarky. The model is also related to Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1984) who study foreign direct investment under the risk of expropriation. They argue
that the level of intangible assets is an important determinant of heterogeneity in international
capital ‡ows. They show that it may be optimal for investors to overinvest in technologies with
more intangible assets in order to reduce the risk of expropriation. I extend their analysis by
also modeling foreign indirect investments, where the absence of intangible assets increases the
incentives to expropriate.
Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion ofthe normative implications of my results.
Appendix A contains the proofs of the propositions in the paper.
2 The Model
I think of the model as one of lending to developing countries.10 First, for these economies
there is a stronger belief that legal enforcement of international contracts is subject to political
willingness and uncertainty, and henceis more fragile. Second, I think that capital ‡ows among
developed countries are very di¤erent in nature.11 In line with this interpretation, I model the
supply of international capital by assuming that international investors are risk neutral and
unconstrained.
The basic framework is from Thomas and Worral (1994). As discussed above, I enrich
their model along several dimensions. I allow heterogeneous capital ‡ows. In doing so, I
impose considerable symmetry between the di¤erent capital ‡ows. Besides tractability, the
main purpose is to isolate the e¤ect of the inalienability of FDI.
position is implied. Balance of payments data do not include capital raised in host countries as FDI. Also they
omit cross-border ‡ows of goods and services. For more details see UNCTAD (1999).
10However, my choice of interpretation should not constrain the reader’s.
11An example of this di¤erential behavior is the much higher percentage of Mergers and Acquisitions that
accounts for FDI between developed countries. Mergers and Acquisitions in total FDI for developing countries
was only 12.4 percent in 1997, up from 5.4 percent in 1991. In contrast, the worldwide share of Mergers and
Acquisitions in FDI in‡ows averaged 50 percent during 1985-97 (UNCTAD (1998)).
5The economy consists of many international investors and a domestic representative con-
sumer. All international investors are alike and the domestic consumer is indi¤erent between
whom he meets. The domestic consumer is risk averse while international investors are risk
neutral. There are three investment opportunities available to international investors. One is
the international bond market which o¤ers a constant interest rate r. International investors
can also invest in two projects located in the host country. The two projects di¤er …rst and
foremost in the degreeto which they can be appropriated by the domesticconsumer. I interpret
‡ows into the inalienable project as FDI and ‡ows into the alienable project as non-FDI.12 I
do not model the location/entry decision of multinational companies. This is an extremely
useful abstraction that allows me to focus on the dynamics of the …nancial capacity of the host
country.
In this setup long term contracts between investors and borrowers are written contingent
on any possible history of events. As Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Green (1987) originally
showed, there exists a recursive representation to these contracts. To conserve on notation and
space I make use of these results to write the problem directly in a recursive fashion. I shall
make brief use of the sequence representation of these contracts in the next section.
There is only one aggregate shock s. The aggregate shock s follows the continuous autore-
gressive process with serial correlation ½, and unconditional mean ¹ s,






The choice of a single aggregate shock is motivated by a desire to remove any asymmetries
between the investment choices besides those originating from the inalienability of FDI. It is
easiest to think of the aggregate shock as being total factor productivity shocks, but we may
also think of shocks to the country’s banking system, or to the exchange rate system. The
initial shock s0 is drawn from a distribution F (s).
At the beginning of the period the long term contract assigns an utility level V to the
12The International Monetary Fund’s de…nition of FDI comprehends all investments with lasting corporate
control interests on …rms residing in other countries, typically with equity shares of 10 percent or more (see
Lipsey (1999) for a summary and history of several de…nitions). It is clear from discussions at the IMF on
measurement issues that the goal in the breakdown between FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment (e.g. equity
securities, debt securities, money market instruments and …nancial derivatives)and OtherInvestments(e.g., trade
credit, loans, …nancial leases, currency deposits) is to capture under FDI those ‡ows which normally include the
transfer of intangible assets (see for example UNCTAD 1999). Therefore, the focus of IMF’s de…nition and mine
is on measuring the same ‡ows. As Caves (1996, p. 1) puts it: “Exact de…nitions are unimportant for this
study, because economic analysis in fact emphasizes that at the de…nitional margins decision makers face close
trade-o¤s rather than bimodal choices.”
6developing country. This life-time utility level is obtained through a period utility of ln(c) and












where E(:js) is the conditional expectations operator.
The contract speci…es how output is divided between domestic consumption (c), repay-
ment of the loan’s principal and interest ((kf +ko)(1+r)), and additional transfers (¿(s0))
(thesemay include additional interest charges for default premia or more loans to the country).
The output results from two investment projects in which international investors participate.
These projects may di¤er in their capital share ®f, ®o < 1. This gives the aggregate resource
constraint:







where kf is the level of FDI or inalienable capital input, ko is the level of appropriable capital
input, and A is a relative scale factor. The model embeds tax advantages of FDI whenever
A > 1. As it will become clear later on the scale factor can explain FDI levels, but not
the relative volatility of FDI in the absence of inalienability. I abstract from other factors of
production by assuming they are …xed factors. This of course ignores any crowding out or
crowding in that might ensue, but is irrelevant if the impact on the domestic factor markets of
these heterogenous forms of capital is symmetric.13
Forsimplicity, I assumefull depreciationforbothcapital stocks. Besidesthedi¤erent capital
shares, theonly other distinction I makebetween FDI and other capital ‡owsis in theway each
of the inputs a¤ects the developing country’s utility level under autarky, U (kf;ko;s0). (More
on this below.)
The host country’s representative consumer cannot commit to a long term contract. Inter-
national investors have commitment, but of a limited nature in that a participation constraint
must be satis…ed. As in Thomas and Worral (1994) I de…ne a self-enforcing contract by re-
quiring that capital ‡ows obey two participation constraints.14 For both types of agents the
13Since all of the …nancing comes from the international lender, one might think that the contract would look
di¤erent if the domestic investor was allowed to self-…nance some of the production. In fact the international
lender is doing all the feasible and e¢cient …nancing. In the simulations below, the time series of average
consumption growth for the domestic investor is positive, which re‡ects the fact that his required rate of return
is higher than r. However, he can only save at r. See also the discussion on contract implementation in
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002).
14This assumption is more in line with real life scenarios. Giving full commitment to the international investor
does not change the qualitative nature of my main results.
7participation constraint says that the utility underthe contract is at least as large as theutility











for every s0 2 S. Constraint (4) is a necessary condition to generate endogenous barriers
to international capital ‡ows by limiting the size of ko and kf. The international investors’
participation constraint limits long term losses at any time. Denoting the utility function of an
international investor in state (V; s0) by B (V; s0), this restriction dictates that B (V;s0) ¸ 0.
Before continuing, I describe the timing of the model in a more organized fashion. Figure
2 presents a visual description of the main events during each period. At the beginning of
each period, and before the shock s0 is realized, the investment of ko, and kf is made, and
consumption isdecided.15 Afterwards, the aggregateshock is observed and output is generated.
At this stage the consumer may choose to default on the contract. If default does not occur,
output is allocated into consumption and other transfers as previously determined.
[Figure 2 here.]
The utility of an international investor is the expected sum of discounted net ‡ows (at rate
r) from the borrowing country:



















subject to (2)-(4) and to B (V (s0); s0) ¸ 0 for all s0. The constraint that V (s0) ¸ V, with
V >¡1, is introduced becausethe period utility ofthedomesticconsumerisunbounded. The
value of V can be interpreted as the lowest utility the domestic consumer can expect to get
under autarky.16
Note that the problem of maximizing (5) subject to (2)-(4) is formally very similar to the
usual small open economy problemin International Macroeconomics. Except forthenon-default
constraint (4), the main di¤erence is that instead of maximizing the consumer’s lifetime utility
15The reader can imagine that the international investor actually produces the capital one period in advance,
since the capital allocation decision is made before the productivity shock is realized and before output is
produced.
16An alternative interpretation is that V is the utility level the domestic consumer can obtain by joining
another investor as in Phelan (1995).
8subject to resource and balance of payments constraints, I solve for the dual problem in which
the international investor’s lifetime utility is maximized subject to a resource constraint and
the agents’ utility (2). I show below that the solution to (5) lies on the Pareto frontier and so
the two problems coincide.
Let me now describe theborrower’s autarky problem. In solving for the borrower’s autarky
solutionitisassumedthat: (i) default occurson both capital ‡owssimultaneously;17 (ii) without
the human capital from the international investor the FDI technology cannot be operated any
longer once the country defaults; and (iii) only a share of the current revenues µ 2 [0; 1] can be
transformed into investment towards the appropriable activity or consumption. Thus, 1¡µ is
thedegree of inalienability ofFDI. Even though I model (ii) and (iii) as exogenous, they can be
motivated as a rational response of multinational …rms to country risk (Eaton and Gersovitz
1984).
Under these assumptions, the value of the host country’s representative consumer under
autarky is given by:





































It is easy to check that








where d0, d1, and d2 are positive constants.18 In deriving (6), I make extensive use of the
assumptions of log-utility and full depreciation.
What is theroleof the assumptionsonthe FDI activity? It is critical that someoutput from
the FDI activity be lost if the country defaults. This is the basic assumption of the paper. It is
17Note that the possibility of default on only one ‡ow at a time favors the risk sharing role of FDI. Again, this
symmetry is intended to isolate the e¤ect of the inalienability on the volatility of both ‡ows.
18These constants are: d1 = ¹ d1=®o, ¹ d1 = ®o= (1 ¡¯®o), d2 =
¡
1 +¯ ¹ d1
¢
=(1 ¡¯½), and













with ¯ = 1=(1 +r).
9not important that theoutput from the FDI activity can also be used for investment, although
this makes the results stronger and easier to derive. Finally, I want to emphasize that µ does
not act like a tax, though it could be interpreted as a state-contingent tax: FDI ‡ows are not
subject to this tax if the country does not default (see (3)).
Equilibrium Contracts
At the start of the contract the international investor makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of
contingent sequences of fkot;kft; ¿t;ctg
1
t=0 to the domestic consumer. An equilibrium contract
gives just enough expected revenues to the international investor that compensates her for




B (V;s0)F (ds0) ¸I
ª
. These …xed costs may be
related to setting up a factory or promoting a brand name.
Having formulated the problem I now turn to a characterization of the solution.
3 The Optimal Composition of Capital Flows
The self-enforcing nature of the contract, in particular the constraint B (V;s) ¸ 0, makes it
infeasible to use standard dynamic programming arguments to show the existence and unique-
ness of a valuefunction B (:). However, I can show an important property of the function B (:).
Let ht = fsl;kol;kfl; ¿l; clg
t
l=0 be an history of events up to time t. Consider the set ¡ (ht) of
all contract feasible sequences °(ht) = fkol; kfl; ¿l;clg
1
l=t. De…ne recursively the domestic con-





from following the recommendations
of contract ° after history ht. Any contract in ¡ satis…es the self-enforcing constraints, the
resource constraint (3), and V (°;ht+1) ¸ V from time t ¸0 onwards. The constrained-Pareto
frontier at time t that yields at least utility Vt to the domestic consumer is de…ned by the
mapping:












whereB (°;ht) is de…ned recursively by B (°;ht) =E[¿(ht+1)+ 1
1+rB (°; ht+1)]. Finally, de…ne
BF to be the Pareto frontier that results if the self-enforcing constraints are dropped. That is
BF characterizes the Pareto frontier when full commitment is possible by both agents.
The…rst result saysthat theconstrained-Pareto frontiercanbecomputed using therecursive
approach outlined in the previous section. Let T be the operator described in (5), that is


















10where the maximization is subject to (2)-(4) and f (V (s0); s0) ¸ 0 for all s0. Construct the
sequence of functions f(0) = BF , f(n) =T
¡
f(n¡1)¢
, for n ¸1, by iterating on the operator T.
Lemma 1 (Thomas and Worral 1994, Lemma 1) f(n) converges to BP pointwise.
Thus, I can take B (V; s) =BP (V;s). An immediate consequence of this lemma is that the
optimal contract will giveallocationsthat lieinthedownwardslopingportionoftheconstrained-
Pareto frontier. Together with the fact that in equilibrium thedomestic consumer is extracting
themaximal surplusfrom theinvestor, these allocations are thebest possibleones thedomestic
consumer would have chosen if he were to choose a contract ° himself for any given value of B.
Assumethat B isconcaveinV foreachs. Thiswill becon…rmed inall thesimulations below.
Suppose the current state is (V;s). Let ¼0 be the conditional density of the aggregate shock.
Attach the Lagrange multipliers ¸; ¼0Ã(s0), ¼0±(s0), and ¼0Á(s0), respectively to constraints
(2), (4), B (V (s0);s0) ¸ 0, and V (s0) ¸ V for each shock s0. Eliminating the variable ¿, the






























































=0, for all s0;
together with the constraints (2), (4), and B (V (s0);s0) ¸ 0 and V (s0) ¸ V for each shock s0.







with associated Lagrange multipliers.
The …rst condition together with the envelope condition just say that the slope of the
constrained-Pareto frontier is given by E[Ã (s0)js] ¡c < 0. Thus, the expected value of the
shadow cost of the default constraints is bounded above by c. The second and third conditions
dictate the optimal composition of capital ‡ows. In each, the rate of return, denoted rkx, or
marginal expected product of capital, is equated to its marginal cost r, plus a default premium.
The default premium for capital kx is de…ned as E[Ã (s0)Ukx (kf; ko;s0)js]; it measures the
marginal cost of higher incentives to default brought about by a marginal unit of capital.
Finally, the last condition describes the trade-o¤ across di¤erent states ofnature when choosing
continuation utility levels.
11I use the …rst order conditions (7) and (8) to de…ne …nancing constraints in the model.
A …nancially constrained country has positive default premium of either capital. This is a
de…nition of …nancing constraints on the intensive margin.
I start with the analysis of capital ‡ows when there is full commitment by both agents.
This will give a benchmark for comparison and will help understand the role of commitment in
generating …nancial constraints.
3.1 The Perfect Enforcement Solution
To better understand the role of imperfect enforcement and the inalienability of FDI, I start
by analyzing the solution under perfect enforcement. Eliminating the self-enforcing constraints
from the problem yields the following solution (i.e. set ±(s0) =Ã (s0) =0):



















for a country starting the current period with shock s. There is no default premium. The ratio
of the elasticity of kf to changes in s to the elasticity of ko tochanges in s is (1 ¡®o)=(1 ¡®f):
Proofs of all propositions can be found in the appendix. Clearly, the self-enforcing con-
straints are at the heart of the …nancing friction. In an economy with perfect enforcement the
default premium is zero and marginal revenues are equalized. The di¤erent sensitivity of cap-
ital ‡ows can only arise because the capital shares di¤er across the investment opportunities.
Inalienability plays no role. Hence, the role of inalienability is directly linked to the existence
of borrowing constraints and default risk.
What is the role of taxes in explaining the relative volatility of FDI? Recall that A >1 has
theinterpretation ofa subsidy to FDI. Subsidies are irrelevant to therelative sensitivity of FDI
(though they are a key determinant of the level of FDI). As we will see below this will also be
the case when µ =0 (maximum inalienability of FDI).
3.2 The Imperfect Enforcement Solution
The …rst main prediction of the model concerns the default premium and level of FDI versus
other ‡ows.
12Proposition 3 The default premium is higher for non-FDI ‡ows. When the elasticities ®f =
®o andA ¸ 1, the level of FDI is no smaller than the level of appropriable capital, i.e., k¤
f ¸k¤
o.





inequality holding strictly every time the country is constrained.
If A <1 then the concavity of the production functions is not the only ingredient a¤ecting
the composition of capital ‡ows. Hence, it is possible to have k¤
f <k¤
o when A is small enough.
With the …nancing frictions in place the default premium becomes positive for both ‡ows.
FDI’s default premium is lower because these ‡ows are less appropriable under default, which
implies that FDI ‡ows are relatively closer to their unconstrained optimum. This leads to a
corollary that constitutes a new prediction of the model regarding FDI ‡ows:19
Corollary 4 The FDI share of total private in‡ows is higher for …nancially constrained coun-
tries if, and only if µ <1.
How does the relation between default premia and size translate into volatility? This ques-
tion is in general very hard to answer, but when shocks are iid it turns out that there is a sharp
result.
Proposition 5 Let the aggregate shock be iid. The ratio of the elasticity of kf to changes in V
to the elasticity of ko to changes in V is smaller than (1 ¡®o)=(1 ¡®f) if, and only if µ <1.
This is the second main result of the paper. It implies that for …nancially constrained
countries FDI is less volatile than non-FDI ‡ows, provided FDI is partly inalienable µ < 1 and
®o ¸ ®f.20 To understand this result, and for simplicity of exposition, let the input shares
be identical (i.e., ®f = ®o). Recall from Proposition 3 that in this case FDI carries a smaller
default premium or rate of return. Thus, shocks that increase the borrowing capacity of the
host country (by increasing future V) lead to larger adjustments of non-FDI ‡ows, because
these ‡ows have higher rates of return and are farther away from the optimum.
19This result contrasts with Kraay et al. (2000) who also use the inalienability of FDI to discuss its relative
size. Their result seems to depend upon the assumption that the probability of default does not change as more
FDI and non-FDI capital ‡ow into the country.
20Note that this proposition and proposition 2 cannotbe used to compare relative volatilities acrossconstrained
and unconstrained countries. This is so because with iid shocks volatilities of ‡ows under perfect enforcement
are trivially zero.
13Several comments are in order. First, since under perfect enforcement there is no di¤erence
in volatilities (with equal input shares), this di¤erence must arise because of the …nancing
constraint and oftheinalienability ofFDI (µ <1). Second, thequalitativeresult isindependent
of the size of subsidies A. Third, only if the capital share of FDI is larger than that of non-FDI
‡ows (®f > ®o), could FDI become relatively more volatile. The reason is that, even if the
optimal values k¤
f and k¤
o were equal, the relative convexities of the production functions might
inducea stronger responseofkf. This makes it harder to analyzethe volatility of capital ‡ows.
However, when shocks are iid and FDI is fully inalienable (µ =0), kf is constant through time
and equal to kF
f . In this case, the relative volatility of FDI is trivially smaller than that of non-
FDI ‡ows independently of the capital shares. (And independently of the subsidy parameter A
as well.) Hence, onewould expect a signi…cant role forthe capital shares, but one that vanishes
as the inalienability of FDI becomes maximal. Finally, the result is only proved for iid shocks.
Below I provide numerical results that show that it holds for reasonable parameter values (and
in particular for positive persistence).
This result rationalizes, based on the risk sharing properties of FDI, the composition of the
recent out‡ows of capital from the East Asian Tigers all of which su¤ered a negative aggregate
shock that tightened (at least temporarily) their access to international credit markets.
4 Quantitative Properties of the Model
In this section I report results from numerical simulations of the model.21 I start by analyzing
the path dynamics of the model. Using the time series ofa contract, I then report how relative
volatilities change with the persistence of aggregate shocks and with the degree of appropri-
ability of FDI. Finally, I extend the model to allow for exogenous contract terminations. I use
this new setup to construct a worldwidestationary distribution of countries and recompute the
relevant statistics at the stationary distribution. I also use the stationary distribution to break
the sample into developed versus developing countries and analyze the behavior of these two
groups of countries. Despite ignoring important features of production and investment (recall
that thereis full depreciation ofcapital and no domestic investment orlabor supply), the model
fares quite well in explaining the di¤erential volatilities in FDI and non-FDI ‡ows reported in
the Introduction of the paper.
Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter choices. The period considered is one year. The
21Details on the numerical approximation are available from the author upon request.
14choice of all parameters except µ is borrowed from the real business cycleliterature (seeCooley
and Prescott 1995). The real interest rate is the standard value of 4 percent. The choice of
0:4 for the capital share coincides with estimates for the US economy. It is also consistent
with estimates of the capital share for several developing countries in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, Table 10.8). These estimates range from .29 to .69. I vary the values of the inalienable
parameter µ and the auto-correlation parameter ½ in the experiments.
[Table 1 here.]
To solve the model I discretise the state space. The aggregate shock takes on one of 5
possible values. The transition matrix [¼ij], with ¼ij = Pr[s0 = sjjs = si], is chosen to be a
discrete state space representation of the autoregressive process (1). This is done with the
numerical quadrature method developed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991). To calibrate the
distribution ofthe initial shock, F (s), I use theinvariant distribution induced by thetransition
matrix [¼ij]. For the values of the life-time utility I choose a equispaced grid of 50 points
starting in V and ending in ¹ V. I pick a su¢ciently high upper bound for V. At this level (¹ V)
the country is …nancially unconstrained for all shocks. Also, this choice does not restrict the
optimal solution since B
¡¹ V;sj
¢
< 0, for all j.
I choose V to be 10 percent below the autarky level of life-time utility which is capable
of sustaining the optimal unconstrained choices of kF
f and kF
o for the lowest realization of the
shock. I choose the initial investment I such that all countries start at a value of V0 = V. At
this value, the average starting output is 28 percent below the unconstrained optimal level of
output at the mean shock. This number is in line with reported output losses in economies
that haveexperienced banking orcurrency crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) report that in
banking crisis, bailout costs alone amounted to 21.6 percent in Latin America during the 1970-
1994 period. Numbers for other regions or periods are smaller, with an average of 11 percent.
In currency crisis, the main costs arise from loss of reserves and large real devaluations. On
top of these costs, the disruption of the …nancial and trade sectors may also cause signi…cant
and long lasting output losses. For example, output declined dramatically in Mexico in 1995
(6:2 percent), inIndonesia in1998 (13:7 percent), and is predicted to decline by 10 to 15 percent
in Argentina in 2002.
154.1 Contract Transition Dynamics
To get a better feel for the model it is interesting to analyze the path dynamics generated
by the optimal …nancing contract. Figure 3 presents the time 0 unconditional expected path
dynamics implied by the contract. These dynamics are computed by averaging across 5000
simulations of 10 years each. The dynamics of the default probability, capital ‡ows, utility
levels, transfers, rates of return, and consumption are analyzed. Absent in the picture is the
plot for the aggregate shock because at time 0 the future expected level of the aggregate shock
is its mean.
[Figure 3 here.]
Thedomesticinvestor, sitting at time0, expects the contract to give himincreasing amounts
of utility over time. By building up the utility level of the domestic investor, the international
lender makes staying in the contract more desirable. This implies that more and more capital
can be advanced without a¤ecting the incentives to default. In fact, looking forward, the
domestic investor faces a downward probability of being …nancially constrained. At year 5
already, the time zero (unconditional) probability of being unconstrained forever after is 100
percent.22 At this point the borrower is always strictly better o¤ staying in the contract rather
than defaulting, and the economy looks like one with a perfect enforcement technology. As
…nancing constraints become less binding and more capital is advanced, particularly non-FDI
(which has the highest rate of return), rates of return on domestic investments decline. The
feature that capital in‡ow shares converge to 50 percent of total in‡ows results trivially from
having imposed absolute symmetry on the two technologies in the baseline parameterization.
The easing of …nancing constraints leads to increased output and consumption. However,
growth in both output and consumption slows down over time as the country approaches the
economy with perfect enforcement technology.
The low utility values for the domestic investor at the start of the contract contrast with
the high levels commanded by the international lender. The international lender makes money
earlier in the life of thecontract as repayment forthe initial investment I and capital advances.
Accordingly, transfers (¿) are highest earlier in the life of the contract.
22This seems a very short time. It is a feature of several things including the low input share ® and the fact
that contracts are not broken. I discuss these below.
164.2 Model Statistics
Table2 presents model statisticsfrom 50 simulations of themodel, each with 111 countries over
20 years (the dimension of the sample used to construct Figure 1). All shocks are taken to be
country speci…c. All statistics are averages across the individual country statistics. I present
the standard deviation of HP-…ltered logged ‡ows and the coe¢cient of variation of the ratio
of ‡ows to output. De-trending ‡ows is needed because of the documented non-stationarity
induced by the contract.
The simulation results in Table 2 suggest that the unconditional volatility of FDI is smaller
than that ofother‡owseven when aggregateshocks arepersistent. Quantitatively, themodel is
able to capture a signi…cant di¤erential in volatilities with the ratio of coe¢cients of variations
(or standard deviations of detrended ‡ows) closely matching the numbers discussed in the
Introduction.23 Recall that Proposition 2 shows that for unconstrained countries ®f = ®o
implies that volatilities are also equalized. Thus, the volatility di¤erentials observed in Table 2
depend on countries being constrained during the simulation period.
[Table 2 here.]
Lower persistence of shocks leads countries to start-o¤ relatively less constrained. This
explains why the FDI share is closer to 50 percent and the volatilities are reduced to the
values that would result in the perfect enforcement case.24 Lower persistence also decreases
the unconditional volatility of the aggregate shock. This is an additional explanation for the
drop in the absolute magnitudes of the volatilities when ‡ows are measured in absolute values.
One startling result though, is the persistent volatility di¤erential across di¤erent values of ½,
independently of how ‡ows are measured.
Lowering the degree of inalienability (i.e., increasing µ) reduces the FDI share. Also, in-
dependently of how in‡ows are measured, there is a substantial reduction in the volatility
di¤erential. Thenarrowed volatility gap was to beexpected from the analytical results with iid
shocks.
When FDI has no subsidies (A = 1), the simulated FDI shares are somewhat below the em-
pirical values discussed below. If, fordeveloping countries, FDI isalso driven by tax advantages
23Investment in the model is only 1.5 to 2 times more volatile than output. This lower volatility results mainly
from our assumption that capital is fully depreciated and may explain the low absolute volatility of ‡ows.
24When there are no …nancing constraints and shocks are iid, the volatility of both in‡ows is zero.
17to FDI (A > 1), then the model is able to better …t the observed shares of international ‡ows.
Thisimprovement comes with almost no change in relativevolatilities. This con…rms the initial
results for the perfect enforcement case that tax advantages are important determinants of the
relative level of FDI versus other capital ‡ows, but not so much of the relative volatilities.
Increasing the production input shares results in ‡atter marginal product of capital curves.
This leads to greater volatility of either FDI and non-FDI in‡ows. It also leads to greater levels
of FDI and non-FDI, but relatively moreso of the former. A second e¤ect isthat countries start
relatively more constrained. This second e¤ect tends to amplify both the level and volatility
di¤erences between FDI and non-FDI ‡ows.
4.3 Model with Exogenous Exit
One unrealistic feature of the current setup is that countries grow to become unconstrained
and that this state is absorbing. For the baseline parameterization used in subsection 4.2 this
transition was quite fast. This raises the question of whether ‡ows will ever be constrained in
a stationary distribution of countries.
A simple way to eliminate this absorbing state is to allow exogenous separation during the
contract’s life-time. Let º > 0 be the exogenous exit probability. Exit is assumed to occur at
the end of the period after production has occurred and transfers are paid out. If a country
exits the contract a new contract is o¤ered (possibly with a di¤erent lender) starting at utility
V e. For simplicity, exit is independent ofeconomic activity and at exit the lender gets nothing.
All agents observe and distinguish exogenous from endogenous separations.
The optimal …nancial contract with exogenous exit is obtained by solving

































In an equilibrium contract E(B (V e;s0)) = I, where the expected value is computed under the
distribution function F (:).25
For the results in this subsection, I use the baseline parameterization with ®=:4, and also
® =:5, and let º = 0:02. This exit rate is consistent with the worldwide default experience in
25The full enforcement value B
F is changed accordingly.
18the 20th century (Kraay et al. 2000). I set I so that V0 = V e. Using the baseline parameters
above, Ve > V is calibrated so that there is a 28 percent drop in output upon exit for a
…nancially unconstrained country. As expected, implicit in the stationary distribution is that
only 6 percent of the countries are …nancially constrained in any given year (when ® = :5
this number is 7 percent). As I show below this is di¤erent from the percentage of developing
countries in the stationary distribution.
Starting from the stationary worldwide distribution of utility levels, I again run 50 simula-
tions of111 countries over20 years. Using these simulated paths, Table 3 reports the worldwide
standard deviation of HP-…ltered logged capital ‡ows. For example, for ® = :4, volatility of
FDI is :022 and that of non-FDI ‡ows is :170. These numbers are lower than those reported in
Table 2 but preserve the relative volatility di¤erences.
It is also possible to break the sample of countries into thosethat werein ongoing unbroken
contracts in the 20 years of simulated data and those that did not. The …rst group of countries
corresponds naturally to developed countries and the second to developing countries. Table 3
also presentstherelativesizesofthesesubsets ofcountries aswell asthenumbersfortherelative
volatility of ‡ows. For ® = :4, developed countries represent 64 percent of the world, whereas
this number drops to a more realistic 26 percent when ® = :5. As Proposition 2 showed, the
capital ‡ow volatilities for developed countries are equal and ‡ow shares are 50 percent. Thus,
it is not surprising that the worldwide di¤erences come from di¤erences in volatilities across
developing countries.
Overall the quantitative results are particularly good for ® = :5. Recall that I had picked
® = :4 for the baseline case because it is the US estimate, but ® = :5 is also admissible given
the numbers discussed above for developing countries.
Table 3 also presents serial correlations of ‡ows along the simulated paths for developed
and developing countries using the stationary distribution. The model delivers positive serial
correlation in ‡ows for developing countries (:362 for FDI and :122 for non-FDI ‡ows when
®= :4) as well as for developed countries (:406 when ®=:4 and :357 when ®=:5 forboth FDI
and non-FDI ‡ows). Theserial correlation forboth ‡ows in developed countriesisequal because
the appropriable and inappropriable technologies are identical and ‡ows are at the optimal
levels. Fordeveloping countries, thepositivecorrelation is partly built in the model through the
serial correlationofshocksand partly derivesfrom themodel’s internal propagation mechanism.
To see this note that with zero serial correlation in aggregate shocks the serial correlation in
19‡ows for developed countries is zero whereas for developing countries is :171 for FDI and :086
for non-FDI (numbers not reported in the table). The internal propagation mechanism relies
on risk sharing being provided to thedomesticinvestor. If a high aggregateshock isfollowed by
a lower shock, risk sharing guarantees that domestic output and consumption decline smoothly.
[Table 3 here.]
The result that FDI ‡ows are more strongly serially correlated than non-FDI ‡ows for de-
veloping countries corroborates the view that non-FDI ‡ows aremore short-term and footloose
than FDI ‡ows (i.e., they are morelikely to change direction). I discuss someevidenceon serial
correlation of ‡ows below.
5 Empirical Evidence on FDI and Financing Constraints
In this section I investigate the model’s new prediction that FDI should be relatively higher
for countries with greater …nancing constraints. The main dataset is the World Development
Indicators from the World Bank (1999b).26 The sample covers virtually every country with a
maximumtimespan from 1975to 1997. Asbefore, Iuseonly private‡owsto thesecountries and
measure FDI and non-FDI ‡ows as percentages of gross private capital ‡ows (normalizing by
GDP-PPP adjusted gives similar results). I also present some evidence on the serial correlation
of ‡ows and relate this to the numbers in Table 3.
5.1 FDI and Financing Constraints
The crudest test that I can make is to identify …nancing constraints with income per capita.
The International Monetary Fund reports that the 1990-98 average FDI shares of private ‡ows
to the middle-income countries was roughly 50 percent and to low-income non-oil exporters
(mineral producers) 70 percent. These numbers are consistent with Razin et al. (1998) who
estimate that the FDI share on private ‡ows to developing countries was about 53 percent
during 1990-95.
26The WDI reports FDI in‡ows from Balance of Payments data. This is subject to two major potential
problems: (1) that investments are reported in the wrong category, and (2) that the 10 percent cut-o¤ rule is
misleading. The second point is particularly important since this breakdown between FDI and other ‡ows is
mostly intended at capturing the existence of a lasting interest in the company, for example, because of the
transfer of intangible assets.
20Theproblemisthat GDP percapita doesnot providea good exogenousmeasureof…nancing
constraints. To overcome this di¢culty I turn to credit ratings for more direct measures of
…nancing constraints. Credit ratings are correlated with measures of …nancing constraints to
theextent that they measuretheability/cost ofcountriesto accessinternational capital markets.
One such measure is Moody’s sovereign credit ratings. Moody’s ratings are classi…ed as
{Aaa,Aa,A,Baa,Ba,B,Caa,Ca,C}, from long term sovereign bonds and notes of the highest
quality with interest payments “protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin and
principal issecure” to a classofbondswith “extremely poor prospectsofever attaining any real
investment standing” (Moody’sInvestorsService1999). In each category from Aa through Caa
Moody’s applies numeric modi…ers of {1,2,3} from high rank to low rank, which I aggregate. I
ignore the rating on debt placed through o¤-shore banks.
There are two main advantages of using sovereign credit ratings as a measure of …nancing
constraints. One advantage of Moody’s credit ratings is that these ratings measure only ex-
pected credit loss over the life of the security. “They are not intended to measure other risks
[...], such as market risk (the risk of loss in the market value of a security)” and “as opinions
of long-term credit strength, they are not intended to rise with the business cycle,” (Moody’s
Investors Service 1999). Thus, investment risk (which drives FDI) is not the focus of this
credit rating variable. This in principle removes any endogeneity problem from this variable.
Nevertheless, I recognize that Moody’s sovereign credit rating may be associated with some
Macroeconomic factors that a¤ect the desirability of international investors to lend to domes-
tic private and o¢cial institutions, which would concurrently in‡uence the capital budgeting
decisions of multinational companies.27 A second advantage of using Moody’s ratings is that
sovereign risk is arguably the best way to think about default risk in my model. Becausein the
model default occurs on both ‡ows simultaneously, it is better viewed as caused by the coun-
try’s government. In fact, this is the case for most default that occurs through either direct or
indirect expropriation (e.g. raising taxes or tari¤s and devaluing the domestic currency).
Figure 4 illustrates the unconditional association between (end ofthe year) Moody’s ratings
and FDI ‡ows. In it, I plot the simple average share of FDI in‡ows on gross private capital
‡ows by credit rating (solid bars). I treat each data point as a country-year observation and
aggregate across country-years with identical credit rating.28 The diamonds in the picture give
27For example, restrictions on capital ‡ows may be observed in countries with lower credit ratings and with rel-
atively higherFDI levels. Nevertheless, the e¤ectonthe relative volatility of the di¤erent ‡ows is not immediately
implied.
28China has had the investment grade rating of ‘A’ since Moody’s started rating its sovereign debt. This
21thenumber of observations used to computeeach average (right axis). The…gure suggests that
countries with lower credit ratings have greater in‡ows of FDI.
[Figure 4 here.]
I now analyze the power of this association in a conditional sense. I also report the same
regressions with two other measures of country risk; one by Euromoney and the other by
Institutional Investor. In conducting these regressions I condition on a variety of variables that
are relevant for explaining FDI and that may be correlated with the measures of …nancing
constraints: country size (log GDP per capita PPP adjusted=lgdpc), trade openness (trade
volume as percentage of GDP=open), …nancial development (liquid liabilities as percentage
of GDP=…ndepth),29 law and order (law), stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP
(mktcapg), and the credit rating. Except for credit rating and law and order all variables were
obtained from the WDI dataset. The index ‘law’ was obtained from the International Country
Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services Group and measures the willingness to accept and
implement laws and adjudicate disputes by the citizens of a country (see also La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998).
From panel A in Table 4, these variables account for a signi…cant portion of the total
variation in FDI: 17-23 percent. In fact, the explanatory power comes exclusively from the
credit rating variable. The addition of other variables, though statistically signi…cant in some
cases, does not contribute to an important increase in the explanatory power of the regression.
Also, the e¤ect is economically signi…cant: going from ‘Aaa’ rating to ‘B’ rating increases the
shareofFDIin grossprivate‡owsby 9-14 percentagepoints. Furthermore, theslopes associated
with the credit rating dummy variable display a quasi-monotonic behavior.30 To conclude, I do
not claim to explain most ofthevariation in FDI based on default risk, but I do think that there
is a strong negative link between FDI and the quality of sovereign credit (see also Hausmann
and Fernández-Arias 2000).
rating has been under review for downgrading to ‘Baa’ during most of this time. Though China seems to
have an abnormally high relative level of FDI, excluding it from this picture–and from the empirical analysis
altogether–does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of the results.
29The choice of ‘…ndepth’ as an indicator of …nancial development follows Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999).
When liquid liabilities (or M3) is not available Money and Quasi-money as percentage of GDP (M2) was used
(see Beck, Levine and Loayza 1999). An alternative measure of …nancial depth is the amount of credit to the
private sector as a percentage of GDP. Using this variable instead of Liquid Liabilities produced similar results.
30A Wald test of the null hypothesis of equal parameters (on the dummy variables) against the alternative
one-sided hypothesis of increasing parameters rejects the null in all four regressions at the 1 percent level.
22The negative sign of ‘lgdpc’ con…rms my previous unconditional analysis. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001) document a negative conditional correlation between GDP per capita and the
stock of FDI to total private in‡ows.
It is interesting to notethat the development of…nancial marketsasmeasured by ‘…ndepth’,
or the stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP, does not eliminate the explanatory
power of the measure of credit rating. This is important because it could be argued that credit
rating proxies for underdeveloped capital markets: if there is limited scope for diversi…cation
by international investors using marketable securities they will supply relatively more FDI.
[Table 4, Panel A here.]
Finally, the measure of law and order is also insigni…cant and leaves the estimates on the
credit rating dummies almost unchanged.
To assess the robustness of the analysis I also conduct the estimations with two broad
measures of country risk: one by Euromoney, ‘EM’, and another by Institutional Investor,
‘iinv’. ‘EM’ measures political risk, access to short term …nancing, the likelihood of debt
rescheduling, and economic risk; 100 being the safest and 0 the riskiest. Data for ‘EM’ is
available for 1996 and 1997. ‘iinv’ ranking is based on a survey of international bankers, and is
designed to capture political, economic, and …nancial risks, that might lead to credit default;
100 is the least risky and 0 the riskiest. Data for ‘iinv’ is available from September of 1979
through September of 1997 for most countries. (Using the numbers published in March by
Institutional Investor results in very similar estimations.)
[Table 4, Panel B here.]
The results are shown in Table 4B. The regressions with ‘EM’ and ‘iinv’ broadly con…rm
the previous results that country credit ratings are strongly negatively associated with FDI.
By construction, these measures of country risk are much broader then Moody’s sovereign
default risk (hence, more subject to endogeneity problems). Even so, they show a very strong
correlation; the Spearman correlation coe¢cient between ‘moody’ and ‘EM’ is .89 (‘moody’ is
a variable that takes the value of 6 for a country with ranking Aaa, 5 if its ranking is Aa, and
so on), between ‘iinv’ and ‘moody’ is .95, and between ‘iinv’ and ‘EM’ is .97. These facts could
23explain why thesedi¤erent ratings show such strong association with FDI, but also why output
is no longer statistically signi…cant when I use EM or iinv instead of the dummy variables from
Moody’s.31 Being broader measures of country risk they are also highly correlated with the
index ‘law’ (linear correlations of .73 in absolute value) though not so much with stock market
capitalization (linear correlations below .48 in absolute value). When I ignore the measures of
country risk and regress the FDI share on gross ‡ows onto income, trade openness, and each
of the other variables separately, only ‘law’ comes signi…cant, but with a positive coe¢cient.
A positive sign on ‘law’ indicates that this variable could proxy for better property rights
protection or commitment technologies.
These measuresof country risk rating still reveal an economically signi…cant impact on FDI.
For example, going from the best overall rating of 100 to the lowest possible rating increases
the FDI share in gross private ‡ows by 10-40 percentage points according to ‘EM’ and by 10
percentage points according to ‘iinv’. The estimated impact of Institutional Investor’s country
risk rating on the share of FDI is similar to that of Moody’s sovereign credit rating.
Finally, in both panels of Table 4, openness of a country does not seem to be important in
explaining FDI ‡ows. It is however hard–and is not the purpose of this paper–to say that trade
barriers do not explain FDI ‡ows. The only purpose of including this variable is to show that
therobustness of the results survives including a measure of trade barriers. In otherrobustness
checks I have also estimated these regressions including time dummies with similar results.
Excluding the OPEC countries in the sample also does not a¤ect the results.
5.2 Serial Correlation of FDI and Other Private Capital Flows
The model simulations indicated another property of the optimal contract and the stationary
distribution under the baseline parameters. This property referred to a strong positive serial
correlation of detrended capital in‡ows, with FDI’s serial correlation being higher than that of
non-FDI ‡ows. Using the same annual WDI dataset, I compute the serial correlation of the
share of FDI in‡ows in gross ‡ows as well as the serial correlation of the share of other in‡ows
in gross ‡ows. As before, computing these statistics is legitimate because these measures of
‡ows are stationary. Most countries display a positive serial correlation in both ‡ows. For FDI
the average annual serial correlation is :35 with a t-statistic of 10:3, and for non-FDI ‡ows
31Note also that (i) the regression of the FDI share on lgdpc produces a slope coe¢cient of -.028 signi…cant
at the 1 percent level, but an R
2 of only .5 percent, and (ii) the correlation coe¢cient between lgdpc and EM is
0.87, and that between lgdpc and iinv is 0.75.
24the average annual serial correlation is :297 with a t-statistic of 7:4. These are large numbers
compared to net portfolio equity in‡ows (a component of non-FDI ‡ows). For example, for
developed countries, Albuquerque et al. (2002) report monthly serial correlations below :6
for net portfolio equity in‡ows originating in US investors (as percentage of foreign market
capitalization), and annual serial correlations close to zero.
Recall from Table 3 that the model can match these serial correlations reasonably well. It
can also match the fact that the empirical average serial correlation of FDI is higher than that
of non-FDI, though it should be noted that a test of equality of means on the average serial
correlations using the WDI data cannot be rejected at the usual signi…cance levels.
6 Policy Implications and Final Remarks
The high volatility and low persistence of non-FDI capital ‡ows to developing economies have
generally been negatively portrayed in the media. The model developed here suggests that
these characteristics simply re‡ect the optimal responses of international investors to changes
in default risk. The model also suggests that the relatively large proportion of FDI in private
capital ‡ows to less developed countries re‡ects their poor …nancial status rather than any
comparative advantage. This does not mean that FDI is bad for these economies, but rather
that FDIisall that they canget. Froma normativestandpoint themodel suggeststhat countries
trying to expand their access to international capital markets should concentrateon developing
credibleenforcement mechanismsforrepayment. Clearly, this isnot easy to accomplish, but the
international …nance theory suggests some ways to go about it, such as opening the domestic
economy to trade (e.g. Bulow and Rogo¤ 1989). This would allow credit-constrained economies
to attract more of FDI as well as larger short term portfolio equity and bond ‡ows.
There are other dimensions of international capital ‡ows that are worth exploring in the
context of models where imperfect enforcement in international contracts plays a central role.
One important question regards the maturity of capital ‡ows. Another open question concerns
the levels of international capital ‡ows. This last question is particularly important given the
recent observedsteep trendin FDI ‡owsto developing countries. Modelsofrisk sharing based on
imperfect enforcement (e.g. Kehoe and Levine 1993) tend to yield very dramatic quantitative
implications for international capital mobility: countries borrow limited amounts as if they
were on the verge of opting out and moving into autarky (e.g. Marcet and Marimon 1992, and
Kehoe and Perri 2002). This is because, once capital accumulation is allowed in autarky, it
25becomes very di¢cult to sustain borrowing and lending among countries (similarly to Bulow
and Rogo¤ (1989)). In a sense these models provide an answer to Lucas’ (1990) question, but
an extreme one.32 This paper studies two international …nancial instruments, di¤erentiated by
their risk sharing potential. Assets that are inalienable–and thus useless under autarky–can
be used to provide greater insurance and market integration under imperfect enforcement of
contracts. Analyzing theseissues in the context ofgeneral equilibrium modelswith enforcement
constraints is an interesting research avenue.
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2 . Letting Ã (s0) = 0 for all s0 in equations (7) and (8) we obtain the
…rst order conditions: E(s0js)A®fk
®f¡1
f = 1 +r, and E(s0js)®ok®o¡1







can be easily computed from these conditions. There is no default premium.
Notethat countriesareheterogeneous only throughdi¤erent realizationsof theaggregateshock.













Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the …rst order conditions (7) and (8) and replace the



























¸ 0. Since E[Ã (s0)js] is common to
both conditions and determines the extent of …nancing constraints, it must bethat either both
forms of capital are constrained or none. Finally, if E[Ã(s0)js] > 0, so that the domestic








. That is, the default
premium of FDI is lower than that ofnon-FDI. When A ¸1, and ®f =®o, kf > ko obtains.
32Lucas (1990) actually argued that political (country) risk isa recent phenomena, and that it could notexplain
why capital did not ‡ow from rich to poor countries in the colonial times where there was legal enforcement
of contracts. In spite of this, I contend that in the last decades large sovereign debt default and renegotiation
deals associated with capital expropriations have made investors wary of the lack of international enforcement of
contracts. An alternative analysis of heterogeneous international capital goods is done in Hull and Tesar (1999).
26Proof of Proposition 5. Consider conditions (9) and (10) in the proof of Proposition 3.
Notethat with iid shocks the current shock doesnot a¤ect thevalueof capital and countries are
heterogenous with respect to V only. Clearly, each timethecountry is unconstrained ª(V) = 0
and the elasticities of capital inputs to changes in V are zero. When ª(V) > 0, solving (9)
and (10) for ª(V;s), it is possible to write kf as a function of ko. Di¤erentiating the resulting

























where I have used (9) and (10) to get to the second equality. When ®f · ®o this ratio is less
than one if, and only if µ <1, because the numerator and denominator are both positive.
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30Table 1. Baseline Parameters.
Parameter Value Description
µ .1 Appropriability parameter
r .04 Real interest rate
®f .4 capital share of FDI activity
®o .4 capital share of non-FDI
A 1 Scale parameter of FDI activity
½ .95 Auto-correlation of the shock
¹ s 1 Unconditional mean of the shock
¾" .007 Unconditional variance of the shock
31Table 2. Simulation Results.
µ = :1 ½ =:95
½ =:95 ½ = :5 ½ = :1 µ = :1 µ =:5 µ =:9 A =1:2 ® =:5
FDI sharea .551 .537 .532 .551 .519 .505 .618 .621
¾(FDI)b .044 .029 .022 .044 .135 .260 .049 .045
¾(non-FDI)b .738 .352 .283 .738 .334 .304 .721 1.32
CV(FDI/GDP)c .124 .070 .060 .124 .058 .146 .081 .235
CV(non-FDI/GDP)c .320 .251 .224 .320 .196 .172 .310 .542
Notes: (a) Percentage of total in‡ows; (b) Standard deviation of HP-…ltered log ‡ows;
and (c) coe¢cient of variation of non-detrended percentage ‡ows.
32Table 3. Results using the Stationary Distribution.
% of countries FDI sharea ¾(FDI)b ¾(non-FDI)b ½(kft; kft¡1)b ½(kot;kot¡1)b
All Countries
®=:4 – .520 .022 .170 .391 .304
®=:5 – .583 .028 .876 .376 .230
Developed Countries
®=:4 .64 .50 .023 .023 .406 .406
®=:5 .26 .50 .011 .011 .357 .357
Developing Countries
®=:4 .36 .556 .019 .432 .362 .122
®=:5 .74 .614 .034 1.18 .383 .184
Notes: (a) Percentage of total in‡ows; and (b) stand. dev. and correlations of HP-…ltered log ‡ows.
Numbers refer to simulations ran using the baseline parameters.
33Table 4
A. FDI and Sovereign Credit Ratings.
Dependent Variable: Share of
FDI In‡ows to gross ‡ows.
I II III IV V VI
lgdpc -.050¤¤¤ -.053¤¤¤ -.070¤¤¤ -.057¤¤
open -7e-5 7e-5 1e-4 1e-4
Aa .044¤¤¤ .048¤¤¤ .046¤¤¤ .046¤¤¤ .056¤¤¤ .058¤¤¤
A .116¤¤¤ .088¤¤¤ .116¤¤¤ .082¤¤¤ .081¤¤¤ .130¤¤¤
Baa .147¤¤¤ .098¤¤¤ .146¤¤¤ .096¤¤¤ .093¤¤¤ .088¤¤¤
Ba .108¤¤¤ .060¤¤ .106¤¤¤ .060¤¤ .060¤ .063¤




cons .075¤¤¤ .549¤¤¤ .079¤¤¤ .568¤¤¤ .701¤¤¤ .617¤¤¤
R2 .17 .20 .17 .19 .22 .23
N 532 532 532 488 448 364
Notes: Please refer to panel B of Table 4.
34Table 4
B. FDI and Country Risk Ratings.
Dependent Variable: Share of FDI In‡ows to gross ‡ows.
I II III IV V I II III IV V
lgdpc .010 .024 .023 -.014 -.041 -.016 -.021 -.022¤¤ -.046¤¤ -.026¤¤
open -3e-4 -4e-4 -6e-4 -5e-4 3e-4 2e-4¤ 1e-4 -6e-6
EM -.004¤¤ -.004¤¤¤ -.004¤¤¤ -9e-4 -.001




cons .348 .268 .265 .438¤ .620¤¤ .333¤¤¤ .371¤¤ .357¤¤¤ .505¤¤¤ .429¤¤¤
R2 .13 .14 .12 .10 .13 .03 .03 .02 .05 .07
N 201 196 185 156 150 1517 1498 1433 1098 594
Notes: OLS estimates. ‘lgdpc’ is the log of GDP per capita PPP adjusted, and ‘open’ is the trade volume
as percentage of GDP. EM refers to Euromoney’s country rating. ‘iinv’ is Institutional Investor’s Septem-
ber country credit rating. A high number means a good credit rating. Moody’s credit rating is the end of
calendar year rating of debt placed through domestic banks. ‘…ndepth’ is liquid liabilities (M3) as % of
GDP or money and quasi-money as % of GDP when M3 is not available. ‘law’ is the law and order rating
in the International Country Risk Guide of the PRS Group. High points means that there is a strong law
and order tradition. ‘mktcapg’ is the stock market value as % of GDP. A ‘¤¤¤’ indicates signi…cance at
the 1 percent (two-sided) level, ‘¤¤’ at 5 percent level, and ‘¤’ at 1 percent level. ‘N’ is the number of























































If default does 





Figure 2: Sequence of events within a period.
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Figure 4: Average share of FDI in‡ows by Moody’s sovereign credit rating. Full sample.
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